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1. Introduction
Coordination games with heterogeneity in information and complementarity in ac-
tion have been widely applied to macroeconomic environments, financial markets and
even collective actions. Their welfare properties constitute the focus of a line of recent
studies. In this paper, we examine this issue in a context where individuals have finite
channel capacity to process relevant information.
The attention or capacity that individuals possess is scarce. Consequently, they
have to allocate their capacity optimally among various information sources and then
take actions based on the information they acquire. As Sims (2005) argue, this in-
formation processing constraint may have significant welfare implications for under-
standing the effects of policies that reveal public information and can be critical when
evaluating the optimality of policies, e.g., the transparency of public announcements.1
To abstract from a specific market structure and retain tractability, we formalize
our model in a “beauty contest” framework, as in Morris and Shin (2002), where the
payoff for an individual depends on the distance of his action from an unobservable
state and from the average action. To take the best action, agents must estimate the
underlying state and forecast the average action of others. There are two correlated
signals that reveal noisy information about the fundamental, and they can be observed
if agents pay attention to them. One of the signals is private and contains idiosyncratic
noise, and the other is public, can be potentially observed by all agents and contains
common noise. The main point of departure of our model is to assume that agents can-
not perfectly observe these signals because they possess a limited capacity to process
information. Consequently, agents can only observe these signals with idiosyncratic
observation noises.
One example of the aforementioned setting is that dealer-brokers in financial mar-
kets can easily access a large wealth of information from their clients’ portfolios and
can also analyze public announcements released by the central bank. Both sources
reveal noisy information on the market fundamental. Constrained by the limited
amount of capacity, deal-brokers need to decide on the allocation of their attention
to process each of the noisy signals.
With a fixed amount of capacity to split between these two signals, a number of
forces interact and shape agents’ decisions: decreasing returns to attention, the rela-
tive accuracy of the public signal to the private signal, the coordination motive and
1Sims (2005) argues that “rational inattention may have far-reaching implications for macroeco-
nomics and monetary policy generally, once its implications are fully worked out. In the meantime,
though, it may shed some light on transparency in monetary policy.”
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the correlation between the two signals.2 It is more attractive for agents to observe the
signal with higher accuracy, because a signal of higher quality helps agents estimate
the state more accurately. However, the force of diminishing returns to attention pro-
vides agents with incentives to diversify their attention and spend their capacity on
both signals.3 The coordination motive tilts the attention allocation decision toward
the public signal, which better aligns their actions. Furthermore, a higher correlation
across signals dampens the effect of diminishing returns to attention and amplifies the
effect of the coordination motive.
Questions naturally arise from this setting. Do individuals pick up more signals
when they are better able to process information? Does social welfare necessarily in-
crease when individuals possess more information-processing capacity? In the exist-
ing rational inattention literature, the answers to both questions seem to be yes.4 How-
ever, we show that the answers could be reversed when the signals to be observed are
highly correlated and/or when there exists strong strategic complementarity in ac-
tions. Under these conditions, one intriguing scenario arises, where agents can first
focus on the relatively more precise private signal and then diversify their attention
when capacity is higher; however, when there is a further increase in capacity, they
may reduce their attention on or even ignore the private signal of higher quality and
instead focus on the relatively imprecise public signal. We label this phenomenon
“attention misallocation.” Further, when the coordination motive or correlation is suf-
ficiently high, the relative accuracy is not extreme and the amount of capacity is not
very high, multiple equilibria can arise in this model.
We find a number of distinct results on social welfare, i.e., the average distance be-
tween individual decisions and the underlying state. First, social welfare may decrease
when individuals possess more capacity to process information. This result hinges on
the fact that agents may “misallocate” their attention from a social perspective and the
misallocation may become more severe in response to higher capacity. When there is
an increase in capacity, agents can observe signals more clearly and better estimate the
2Sims (2010) argues that finite capacity can be elastic in response to a change in environment, given
that the marginal cost of information processing is constant. In this case, inattentive agents are allowed
to adjust optimal capacity in such a way that the marginal cost of information-processing for the prob-
lem at hand remains constant, which is consistent with the concept of “elastic” capacity proposed in
Kahneman (1973). Luo and Young (2014) notes that the two assumptions, i.e., constant capacity and
constant marginal cost of information processing, are observationally equivalent in the sense that they
lead to the same model dynamics governed by the Kalman gain. In this study, for simplicity, we focus
on the fixed capacity assumption and do not consider the effect of prior uncertainty on elastic capacity.
3“Diminishing returns to attention” refers to the fact that the marginal increase in the agent’s welfare
is decreasing as capacity increases. Luo (2008) and Luo and Young (2010) illustrate this property in
partial equilibrium permanent income models with inattentive agents.
4For example, Luo (2008) shows that the welfare loss due to finite capacity decreases with channel
capacity within a partial equilibrium permanent income model. Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt (2011)
obtains the same result in a general equilibrium business cycle model.
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underlying state. However, given the desire to align their actions, they may decrease
the attention paid to the private signal, even though it is relatively more precise, and
coordinate even more attention on the less precise public signal. When agents take
action, they assign a larger weight to the observation of the public signal, which exac-
erbates the “overreaction” to the public signal and causes a decrease in social welfare.
Second, the limit case of this model is the world of Morris and Shin (2002), in which
agents possess an infinite amount of capacity and can therefore perfectly observe both
signals. However, strikingly, social welfare in the Morris-Shin world may be even
lower than that in our model with capacity-limited agents. On the one hand, with
a finite amount of capacity, agents have a less precise estimation of the fundamental
than that in the Morris-Shin world. On the other hand, agents may endogenously pay
little attention to the public signal and therefore reduce their reliance on it in their
action which, to a certain degree, alleviates the overuse of the public signal. We show
that the second effect can dominate.
Third, our model also sheds some light on the debate about the transparency of
monetary policy. Morris and Shin (2002) show that social welfare can decrease when
the central bank delivers a clearer public announcement due to an overreaction to the
public signal. Svensson (2006) questions the empirical relevancy of this result and
argues that it only holds when public information is implausibly imprecise. We show
that endogenous attention allocation can amplify the “overreaction,” so that social
welfare can decrease when the precision of the public signal is reasonably high.
Finally, our results also offer a new perspective on the literature covering the effi-
cient use of information. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) show that equilibrium use and
the efficient use of information coincide if and only if the social and private values of
coordination are the same. However, once we allow for an endogenous information
structure, i.e., attention allocation of inattentive agents, this relationship breaks down.
2. Related Literature
There are two distinct approaches to modeling information acquisition in the related
literature: “costly acquisition” and “attention allocation.” Pioneering studies that adopt
the costly acquisition approach examine the implications of information acquisition in
coordination games by assuming that agents pay a cost to acquire information, e.g.,
Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), Myatt and Wallace (2012) and Ming (2013).
In contrast, we follow Sims (2003) and assume that agents split a fixed amount of
capacity on the signals to be observed. This approach is necessary for our work be-
cause we want to offer a welfare analysis of the coordination game played by rationally
inattentive agents to study the effect that attention allocation has on social welfare.
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The advantage of this approach is that it is not indispensable to specify the exogenous
functional forms of costly attention, which would substantially affect agents’ choice
and welfare. We also relate the insights from our model to the literature on the social
value of public information. To achieve a clean comparison of social welfare between
models with exogenous and endogenous information structures, this approach seems
to be a natural choice for this particular problem.
Our setup differs from those of recent contributions to the literature that explicitly
deals with welfare-related issues. Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt (2009, 2011) study how
individuals or firms allocate their attention among two independent states when they
set the price in a market-based economy or take collective actions. In our case, the
two signals are correlated. We explicitly characterize the role of their correlation in
optimal attention allocation and show that correlation is of critical importance for the
multiplicity and uniqueness of equilibrium. For example, a high coordination motive
does not necessarily give rise to multiple equilibria, unless the correlation between the
two signals is sufficiently high.
This paper is closely related to the literature on the efficient use of information,
e.g. Angeletos and Pavan (2006) and Colombo, Femminis, and Pavan (2012). The lat-
ter studies the interaction between the inefficient use and acquisition of information.
In their model, agents pay to gain private information and can observe the public
announcement precisely. In contrast, agents in our model can observe neither of the
signals perfectly. Unlike their setup, which has a unique equilibrium, the rational inat-
tention assumption in our model gives rise to the possibilities of multiple equilibria
and of one of the signals being endogenously ignored.
Our work also contributes to the growing literature on the social value of public
information. Cornand and Heinemann (2008) consider an interesting setup in which
only a fraction of the agents are allowed to observe the public signal. In our model,
agents can endogenously choose to ignore either public or private information, or di-
versify their attention between both. Myatt and Wallace (2009) study this issue in a
model with multiple information sources that differ in the degree of publicity. In our
model, the publicity of public information is endogenous: the idiosyncratic observa-
tion noise is determined by the amount of attention paid.
This paper is also broadly related to the literature on information choice, attention
allocation and asset allocation, which includes Peng (2005), Peng and Xiong (2006),
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009, 2010) and Mondria (2010). The framework adopted
in these studies consists of multiple assets and a continuum of agents who face the in-
formation processing constraints.
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3. The Model
3.1. Players, Payoffs and Coordination
The economy is occupied by a continuum of agents, indexed by i ∈ (0,1). Each of them
can choose an action, ai ∈ R. In this economy, the fundamental state, θ, affects payoffs
of agents. It is selected by nature but unknown to agents. Following Morris and Shin
(2002), the payoff for agent i is specified by
ui = −(ai − θ)2 − α1− α (Li − L¯), (1)
where α is constant, such that 0< α < 1, and Li =
∫
(aj − ai)2dj and L¯ =
∫
Lidi.
When agent i takes action, two types of loss are incurred. The first component is
measured by the distance between individual action and the uncertain state: agents
would be better off if they were to choose an action closer to the fundamental. The
second component is the distance between individual and average actions, which cap-
tures the idea that agents want to align their actions. A higher α implies that agents
assign a larger weight to this strategic concern in their payoff structure and have a
stronger incentive to coordinate.
3.2. Information Structure
Agents begin with some knowledge of the underlying state. Specifically, they share a
common normal prior over θ,
θ ∼ N
(
θ,σ2
)
(2)
where θ and σ2 are the mean and variance of the prior distribution, respectively. Each
agent can access two potentially observable signals, i.e., the private signal xi and the
public signal z, and the distribution is specified as follows,
si =
(
xi
z
)
,
(
θ + εxi
θ + εz
)
, (3)
where εxi ∼ N
(
0,σ2x
)
and εz ∼ N
(
0,σ2z
)
are independent of the true state θ. Note that
εxi is independently and identically distributed across agents while εz is common. The
ex ante covariance matrix of si can be written as
Σ =
(
σ2 + σ2x σ
2
σ2 σ2 + σ2z
)
. (4)
The information structure described thus far resembles that in Morris and Shin
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(2002). The public signal can be interpreted as a public announcement made by the
central bank or statistics released by the public agency. The private signal can be in-
terpreted as information only accessible to individuals and not to the general public.
Noise terms εxi and εz can be interpreted as senders’ noise contained in the signals,
which cannot be reduced by paying attention to the signals. One implicit assumption
is that agents cannot directly observe the fundamental and can obtain information
only through analyzing the noisy signals about it.
Following Sims (2003), we assume that agents have a finite capacity to process
available information, and that the reduction in uncertainty about the true signals is
limited by finite entropy. Therefore, agents can only observe the noisy signals:
sˆi =
(
xˆi
zˆi
)
=
(
xi
z
)
+
(
ξxi
ξzi
)
, (5)
where (ξxi ξzi)
′ are observation noises, which are independent of the true state and the
sender noises, and are independently and identically distributed across agents. The
presence of observation noises reflects the finite information processing capacity. Its
co-variance matrix is given by
Λ =
(
ω2x 0
0 ω2z
)
(6)
where ω2x and ω2z are variances in the observation noises for private and public signals,
respectively. Because the observation noises are idiosyncratic, noisy observation of the
public signal, zˆi, is imperfectly correlated across the agents, whereas the observation
of the private signal, xˆi, remains independent.
The posterior covariance matrix of si can be determined using the following Gaus-
sian updating formula,
Ψ = Σ− Σ (Σ+Λ)−1Σ or Ψ−1 = Σ−1 +Λ−1. (7)
We assume that each agent in this economy possesses a limited amount of capac-
ity to process information. Specifically, each agent is assumed to face the following
information-processing constraint:
1
2
ln
( |Σ|
|Ψ|
)
≤ κ, (8)
where |Σ| and |Ψ| denote the determinant of the prior covariance matrix of si and the
corresponding posterior covariance matrix, respectively, and κ is positive and denote
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the individual’s finite channel capacity. This constraint implies that the reduction in
the uncertainty about the state gained from observing new signals is bounded from
above by a finite capacity.
Given the specifications of (4), (6) and (7), the information processing constraint (8)
can be rewritten as
1
2
ln
(
ω2x +
(
σ2x + σ
2)(1− ρ2)
ω2x
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
κˆx
+
1
2
ln
(
ω2z +
(
σ2z + σ
2)(1− ρ2)
ω2z
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
κˆz
≤ κˆ, (9)
where the prior correlation across signals, ρ, and the effective capacity, κˆ, are defined
by,
ρ2 ≡ σ
2σ2
(σ2x + σ
2) (σ2z + σ
2)
, κˆ ≡ 1
2
ln
(
exp (2κ)− ρ2 (exp (2κ)− 1)
)
.
Effective capacity is the amount of capacity used to reduce observation noises while
a certain amount of capacity must be “wasted” to learn the correlated part of the two
signals twice. Intuitively, for a fixed amount of κ, the higher is the correlation between
signals and the lower is the effective capacity, κˆ. If the signals are independent, i.e.,
ρ = 0, then κ = κˆ.
The effective capacity spent on the private and public signals are denoted by κˆx
and κˆz, respectively. Naturally, we impose the following non-negativity restriction,
κˆz ≥ 0, and κˆx ≥ 0. (10)
The variances in observation noises can be recovered from equation (9) as follows:
ω2x =
(
σ2x + σ
2)(1− ρ2)
exp(2κˆx)− 1 , ω
2
z =
(
σ2z + σ
2)(1− ρ2)
exp(2κˆz)− 1 . (11)
If agents spend more effective capacity on observing a signal, then that signals’ ob-
servation noise is smaller or it is clearer to the agents. In a limit case, agents possess
an infinite amount of capacity and can therefore perfectly observe both signals, i.e.,
ω2x = 0 and ω2z = 0. To facilitate the characterization that follows, we define the rela-
tive accuracy of the public signal by
∇≡
√
(σ2x + σ
2)
(σ2z + σ
2)
,
and it can be readily verified that ρ <∇ < 1ρ .
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3.3. Equilibrium
This model environment can be considered as a two-stage game. In the first stage,
nature draws the underlying state and agents make decisions on their attention allo-
cation by optimally splitting the effective capacity between the signals to be observed.
In the second stage, agents observe the realized signals and then take action.
We focus on a linear symmetric equilibrium in which all agents follow the same
strategy in attention allocation and adopt a linear strategy in actions. Because the
attention allocation is determined in the first stage, the heterogeneity in signal obser-
vations in the second stage does not affect their decision. Once agents decide their at-
tention allocation, the variances in observation noises are also determined. The action
strategy ai in the second stage is linear in both the prior and observations on signals,
ai =Πθ,iθ +Πx,i xˆi +Πz,i zˆi, (12)
where (Πθ,i,Πx,i,Πz,i) are the weights assigned to the prior and observations.
We first solve the second-stage game, where the equilibrium remains unique. The
solution to this game is the optimal weighting rule for any arbitrary allocation of at-
tention in the first stage. Then, we solve for the optimal attention allocation in the first
stage, taking the optimal weighting rule as given.
Given the linearity of the strategy and the normality of the information structure,
we can show that an agent’s action is a weighted average of the observations and their
prior. That is,
Πθ,i +Πx,i +Πz,i = 1. (13)
Individual i’s payoff depends on the other agents’ choices. Let the action strategy
of the other agents be (κˆx, κˆz,Πθ,Πx,Πz). The expected utility of individual i, E[ui],
can be written as the sum of three components,
E [ui] =− 11− α
(
Π2θ,i
1
φθ
+Π2x,i
1
φx,i
+Π2z,i
1
φz,i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
L†
− α
1− α
(
(Πz,i −Πz)2σ2z + (Πθ,i −Πθ)2σ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
L‡
+ C, (14)
with
φθ =
1
(1− α)σ2 , φx,i =
1
σ2x +ω
2
x,i
, φz,i =
1
(1− α)σ2z +ω2z,i
, (15)
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and
C = −α
1− α
[(∫
a2j dj− a¯2
)
− L¯
]
.
The first component of the utility function, −L†, is the quadratic loss of agent i,
when everybody uses the same weights on their signals in action strategy. It shows
that both sender and observation noises are of importance for the expected loss. The
second component, −L‡, is another possible source of expected loss for agent i: uti-
lizing a different action strategy from that used by the other agents. Obviously, when
agent i adopts the same strategy, L‡ becomes zero. Moreover, C is the effect of actions
taken by other agents on agent i and it cannot be affected by her choice. Note that
ω2x,i and ω
2
z,i are the variances of agent i’s observation noises on the private and public
signals, respectively, which are given by (11), and a is the aggregate action.
3.4. Characterization
Agent i maximizes E [ui] by choosing κˆz,i optimally.5 To analyze the equilibrium allo-
cation of attention, we study agent i’s best response allocation strategy. We begin by
defining the relative marginal return of attention on the public signal, which turns out
to be convenient in the analysis of the main mechanisms. That is,
γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z ) ≡
∂E [ui]/∂κˆz,i
∂E [ui]/∂κˆx,i
. (16)
It is straightforward that γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z ) measures the relative attractiveness of paying ad-
ditional attention to the public signal, given others’ attention allocation plan κˆ∗z . There
are four forces that shape the attention allocation decision and thus affect γ. In the
following sections, we fix the correlation between the two signals and discuss the role
of the other three. We elaborate on the effect of the correlation in Section 4.2.
Lemma 1. γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z ) decreases in κˆz,i, increases in ∇, and increases in α.
First, the force of diminishing returns to attention takes hold. The more attention
that is paid to the public signal, the less attractive it becomes. Second, agents prefer the
signal with higher accuracy; that is, the higher its relative accuracy, the more attractive
it is. Third, the coordination motive tilts agents’ choice toward learning the public
signal because they are rewarded in two ways when they spend more attention on
the public signal: they are better informed about the underlying true state and their
actions are better aligned. In other words, due to the coordination motive, the relative
5Note that the optimal weighting rule
(
Π∗z,i,Π
∗
x,i,Π
∗
θ,i
)
in the second stage is uniquely determined
by the attention allocation plan
(
κˆ∗z,i, κˆ
∗
x,i
)
.
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attractiveness of the public signal is magnified. The first part of Lemma 1 also implies
that agent i increases her attention on the public signal if and only if γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z ) > 1,
and decreases her attention if and only if γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z ) < 1.
In symmetric equilibrium, we impose the condition that κˆz,i = κˆ∗z , and three situ-
ations can arise. First, agents spend all of their attention on the public signal, where
γ (κˆ∗z , κˆ∗z )> 1 and κˆ∗z = κˆ. Second, they spend all of their attention on the private signal,
where γ (κˆ∗z , κˆ∗z ) < 1 and κˆ∗z = 0. Third, they split their attention between both signals,
where γ (κˆ∗z , κˆ∗z ) = 1 and κˆ∗z ∈ [0, κˆ]. The following proposition offers the complete
equilibrium characterization.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium attention allocation is such that
κˆ∗z =

0 if ∇≤∇0
˜ˆκz if ∇ ∈ (min{∇0,∇1},max{∇0,∇1})
κˆ if ∇≥∇1
(17)
κˆ∗x = κˆ − κˆ∗z
where
˜ˆκz =
1
2
κˆ + ln
(
(1− α) (1− ρ∇) + (∇− ρ)exp(κˆ)− (1− ρ2)
(1− α) (1− ρ∇)exp(κˆ) + (∇− ρ)−∇ (1− ρ2)
)
(18)
and
∇0 = exp (κˆ)ρ+ 1exp (κˆ) + ρ , ∇1 =
(1− α) (exp(2κˆ)− 1) + (1− ρ2)
(1− α) (exp(2κˆ)− 1)ρ+ exp(κˆ) (1− ρ2) . (19)
There exist multiple equilibria, i.e., κˆ∗z = {0, ˜ˆκz, κˆ}, if and only if
∇1 <∇ <∇0 and α ≥ 1− ρexp(κˆ) ; (20)
otherwise, the equilibrium attention allocation is unique.
When the relative accuracy is extreme, agents find it optimal to focus on only one
of the signals; that is, for a fixed amount of capacity κˆ and a coordination motive α,
if the relative accuracy is sufficiently high, i.e., max{∇1,∇0} ≤ ∇, then agents choose
to only observe the public signal. If the relative accuracy is sufficiently low, i.e., ∇ ≤
min{∇1,∇0}, then agents choose to observe the private signal only.
When the relative accuracy is not too extreme, this model can admit either multiple
10
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Figure 1. The equilibrium uniqueness and multiplicity.
equilibria or a unique equilibrium.6 See Figure 1. Multiple equilibria can arise when
the coordination motive (or correlation) is sufficiently high and/or the total amount
capacity is relatively low. First, the relative accuracy cannot be too extreme for the
existence of multiple equilibria. When everybody focuses on the lower quality signal,
agent i finds that the benefit of deviating and instead focusing on the relatively more
precise signal is dominated by the cost of adopting a different strategy from other
agents. Second, the coordination motive must be sufficiently large, such that when the
strategic concern is strong, agents are more severely punished for deviating from the
strategy adopted by other agents and therefore have less incentive to do so. Third,
if the amount of capacity available is too large, then it is too costly for agent i to fol-
low the others’ strategy, conditional on the rest of the population coordinating on a
“wrong” choice. In contrast, there is only a unique equilibrium if the coordination
motive (or correlation) is not sufficiently strong or capacity is large.
In both cases, a symmetric equilibrium is formed if all agents choose the global
minimizer of L†, because both L† and L‡ (defined in equation (14)) achieve global
minimization and no individual has an incentive to deviate from it. We label it strategic
utility maximizing equilibrium, because it generates the maximum of strategic utility,
which is defined by E[usi ] ≡ −L† −L‡; that is the component, on which the choice of
agents has an influence.
4. Attention Allocation
This paper investigates how information acquisition—specifically the attention allo-
cation of inattentive agents—affects social welfare and related policy prescriptions in
an environment where coordination is an important concern. In this section, we an-
alyze the comparative statics of the equilibrium attention allocation, which provides
6Technically, L† can be either quasi-concave or quasi-convex in κˆz,i. The equilibrium is unique if and
only if it is quasi-concave. In this model, the entropy is not a convex function of signal precision and that
is why multiple equilibria can possibly emerge in this model. In contrast, with the costly acquisition
approach, the cost function of noise reduction is usually assumed to be convex.
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building blocks for our examination of social welfare in Section 5, and policy issues in
Section 6. We also highlight the role that the correlation between the public and private
signals plays in attention allocation, as it is absent in most of the previous literature.
4.1. Non-monotonic Attention Allocation
For any relative accuracy and coordination motive, when the capacity is sufficiently
large, the effect of diminishing returns eventually dominates, which leads to a diversi-
fied attention allocation. Because both signals can be extremely clear, the coordination
motive and relative accuracy do not affect the attention allocation, with agents simply
splitting a large amount of attention evenly between the two signals.
Proposition 2. The share of effective capacity devoted to the public signal, κˆ∗z /κˆ, converges to
1/2, when capacity is sufficiently high.
When the capacity is not large enough, the three forces characterized in Lemma
1 are intertwined and affect how the equilibrium attention allocation responds to an
increase in capacity.
Proposition 3. If the public signal is less accurate than the private signal, agents specialize in
learning the latter, when the capacity is low. When the capacity increases, the share of effective
capacity devoted to the public signal is monotonically increasing, if the private signal is very
precise or the coordination motive is not so strong; otherwise, it is hump-shaped.
In the proof of the proposition, we offer a complete characterization of this com-
parative statics. If the private signal is sufficiently accurate or the coordination motive
is sufficiently low, it is never worthwhile to only observe the public signal, despite
the effect of the coordination motive. The key trade-off here is between the effects of
diminishing returns and relative accuracy, with the former eventually dominating the
latter when the capacity is higher. Let κˆ0 be the threshold value of κˆ, at which agents
are indifferent about specialization in the private signal or diversification. In this case,
when the capacity is higher than κˆ0, the share of attention devoted to the public signal
monotonically increases in κˆ. See Figure 2(a).
If the coordination motive is strong, its effect manifests in the non-monotonicity of
the share of attention spent on the public signal. See Figure 2(b). When there is an
increase in capacity, both the diminishing returns and the coordination motive have
larger effects, and both forces tilt the choice of attention allocation toward the public
signal. Thus, there is a sharp increase in κˆ∗z /κˆ. However, when agents allocate a pre-
dominant share of their attention to the public signal, the mechanism of diminishing
returns to attention takes stronger effect and pushes agents to diversify. The effect of
the coordination motive is eventually dominated and therefore, κˆ∗z /κˆ decreases in κˆ.
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Figure 2. The equilibrium share of attention allocated to the public signal is either monotonic or hump-
shaped in effective capacity.
If the precision of the private signal is close to that of the public one, the effect of
the strong coordination motive can be so prominent that the share of attention on the
public signal can reach 100%. See Figure 2(c). It is interesting to observe that in this
case, agents’ attention fans out, contracts inward, then fans out again. The number of
signals that agents pick up does not monotonically increase in capacity.
Notably, κˆ∗z /κˆ being hump-shaped implies that, the absolute amount of attention
paid to the more precise private signal can decrease (even to zero) when the total
amount of capacity increases, as the result of a strong coordination motive. We label
this effect “attention misallocation.” In Section 5, we demonstrate how this mechanism
critically affects the social welfare of this economy.
Lemma 2. When the private signal is more precise than the public signal, the ab-
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solute amount of effective capacity allocated to observing the private signal can even
decrease in the total amount of capacity, on the condition that 2α+ ρ > 1. Specifically,
dκˆ∗x/dκˆ < 0.
When the coordination motive is very strong, all three equilibria can exist in the
intermediate range of capacity. See Figure 2(d). Intuitively, this is the case in which
none of the effects of relative accuracy, diminishing returns or coordination motive
dominate the other two. Once other agents adopt one of the strategies, it is costly
to deviate because the coordination motive is very high. Note that, in this case, the
diversification equilibrium can never be the strategic utility maximizing equilibrium.7
Therefore, if we focus on the strategic utility maximizing equilibrium, agents can shift
their focus entirely from the private to the public signal when capacity crosses a cutoff
value of κˆs. The key trade-off here is between taking advantage of high accuracy and
the desire for coordination.
In contrast, if the public signal is relatively more accurate, agents specialize in
learning the public signal to take advantage of both higher accuracy and better coordi-
nation when the capacity is lower than κˆ1, i.e., the threshold value at which agents are
indifferent between specialization or diversification. They eventually diversify, due to
the effect of diminishing returns, and the equilibrium share of attention devoted to the
public signal decreases monotonically. See Figure 2(e).
4.2. The Role of Correlation
In this section, we turn to the role of correlation. The indirect effect of a change in
correlation is straightforward. For any capacity κ, a higher correlation reduces the ef-
fective capacity available to agents, dκˆ/dρ< 0. Intuitively, because the two signals are
correlated, observing both of them costs agents some capacity to learn the correlated
part twice. The direct effect is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. For any effective capacity, a higher correlation dampens the effect of dimin-
ishing returns to attention and amplifies the effect of the coordination motive. Specifically, (i)
both κˆ0 and κˆ1 increase in ρ; (ii) κˆs decreases in ρ.
First, for any amount of effective capacity available to agents, the observation
noises are reduced more effectively when the correlation is higher. See equation (11).
Because the two signals are correlated, knowing one of the signals helps reduce the
other’s observation noise. Therefore, agents have a stronger incentive to focus on one
of the signals and the effect of diminishing returns is mitigated.
7When there exist multiple equilibria, L† is quasi-convex and the diversification allocation leads to
a local minimum of E[usi ].
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To demonstrate this, consider the case where only unique equilibrium exists for any
capacity.8 Due to the effect of diminishing returns, agents switch from specialization
to diversification when the effective capacity is higher than κˆ0 for the case of∇< 1 and
κˆ1 for the case of ∇ > 1. When the correlation is higher, both cutoff values increase.
That is, agents find it worthwhile to diversify only when the effective capacity is at a
higher level. In this respect, the effect of an increase in the correlation differs from that
of a rise in the coordination motive α, which raises κˆ1 and lowers κˆ0.
Second, the correlation across signals also amplifies the effect of the coordination
motive. Consider the case where the private signal is more precise. The rise in correla-
tion entails a change in the trade-off between relative accuracy and coordination mo-
tive. In such a case, if agents spend more of their attention on the public signal, they
estimate the underlying state less accurately but they can better align their actions.
When the correlation between the private and public signals is higher, the two sig-
nals become more “substitutable,” in terms of estimating the fundamental. Therefore,
agents incur less welfare loss when they spend capacity on the less accurate public
signal and they favor the public signal even more.
There are three ways to see the effect of this mechanism. First, as shown in Propo-
sition 1, for any effective capacity level κˆ, and relative accuracy∇∈ [∇1,∇0], multiple
equilibria emerge in this model when either α or ρ is sufficiently large. Second, when
we consider the strategic utility maximizing equilibrium in this case, agents shift their
focus from the private to the public signal at κˆ = κˆs. We observe that κˆs decreases in
both ρ and α. Third, in Lemma 2, we show that, on the condition that either α or ρ is
sufficiently high, attention misallocation can arise.
5. "Too Much of a Good Thing": Social Welfare Analysis
Social welfare is the average distance of individual actions in society from the funda-
mental. Agents benefit more from predicting the average opinion than other individ-
uals, but it is a zero-sum game at the society level. In other words, the coordination
motive only affects individual welfare and disappears at the society level. In this sec-
tion, we analyze the comparative statics of social welfare by focusing on the strategic
utility maximizing equilibrium.
The expected social welfare, E [W s (a,θ)], is a weighted average of E [usi ], which is
the objective expected utility maximized by agents, and the spillover effect, which is
not considered by agents. The spillover receives a higher weight in social welfare if
8As shown in Proposition 1, it is the case where α+ ρ/exp(κˆ) < 1.
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the coordination motive, α, is stronger.
E [W s (a,θ)] = −E
[∫
i
(ai − θ)2
]
= (1− α)
[
−σ2
(
1+
φx
φθ
+
φz
φθ
)−1]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[usi ]
+α
[
−Π2θσ2 −Π2zσ2z
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Spillover
.
The unintended spillover effect arises from agents’ desire to align their actions and
the fact that they do not consider the effects that their choices have on others. Agents
make use of the common prior and their correlated noisy observations on the public
signal, when they forecast the actions of others and choose their own actions. As both
the prior and the public signal are noisy, the actions taken by agents may be anchored
around commonly known but imprecise information. Therefore, the spillover con-
tributes negatively to social welfare and its magnitude is determined by how precise
the signals are, i.e., σ2 and σ2z , and how much agents rely on them, i.e., Πθ and Πz.
Proposition 5. (Social Welfare and Capacity) When the capacity to process information
increases, social welfare can decrease. Specifically, there may exist κˆa < κˆb, such that
E [W s(κˆa)] > E [W s(κˆb)] .
It is interesting to observe that a higher capacity to process information does not
necessarily imply higher social welfare. On the one hand, E
[
usi |xˆi, zˆi
]
, the part of wel-
fare optimized by agents, always increases in capacity. On the other hand, the spillover
can cause a decrease in social welfare when there is an increase in capacity. We know
that spending more attention on the private signal reduces the spillover and enhances
social welfare by lowering Πz. However, recall the mechanism of attention misallo-
cation shown in Lemma 2, agents may decrease the absolute amount of attention on
the more accurate private signal when capacity increases, which results in a higher
Πz. Therefore, an increase in capacity can be detrimental to social welfare. In addi-
tion to this mechanism, holding constant κˆ∗x, a higher capacity implies that the amount
of attention allocated to the public signal increases. Therefore, agents assign a larger
weight to their observations on the public signal, zˆi, which is also socially costly.9 In
short, a strong coordination motive or a high correlation between signals can distort
the allocation of attention so much that the spillover increases quickly in response to a
9We show that ∂Πθ/∂κˆ∗x = 0; that is, the increase in φx must equal the decrease in φz when κˆ∗x is opti-
mally chosen. ∂Πθ/∂κˆ < 0, as holding κˆ∗x constant, a higher capacity implies a higher φz and therefore,
Πθ must decrease. Intuitively, when the capacity is higher, agents rely more on their observation(s) and
less on their prior knowledge.
16
κˆE
[W
s
(κˆ
)]
κˆs
b
(a) α = 0.7; ρ = 0.8; ∇ = 0.9135
κˆ
E
[W
s
(κˆ
)]
(b) α = 0.7; ρ = 0.8; ∇ = 0.8971
Figure 3. The non-monotonicity of social welfare.
higher capacity, which results in a decrease in overall social welfare.
To demonstrate this mechanism, we choose a set of parameters with high coordina-
tion motive (or high correlation) and intermediate relative accuracy, such that agents
switch their attention entirely from the private signal to public signal at κˆs, in the
strategic utility maximizing equilibrium.10 When κˆ = κˆs, agents are indifferent about
only observing the private signal or the public signal; that is, E
[
usi |xˆi
]
= E
[
usi |zˆi
]
. In
other words, φx = φz. For the same reason, Πθ is the same in both cases. When κˆ in-
creases from κˆ−s to κˆ+s , κˆ∗x decreases from κˆs to 0 andΠz jumps from 0 to 1−Πθ, so that
there is a discontinuous decrease in social welfare. Because E [W s] monotonically in-
creases in κˆ, when κˆ < κˆs, there must exist κˆa and κˆb such that E [W s(κˆa)] > E [W s(κˆb)]
and κˆa < κˆs < κˆb. See Figure 3(a).
If the accuracy of the private signal is higher (or ∇ is lower), the absolute amount
of attention paid to the private signal decreases gradually and the weight assigned to
the observation on the public signal also increases gradually. Therefore, social welfare
may decrease continuously in capacity. See Figure 3(b). The following equation sum-
marizes the key mechanisms discussed above, where the sign of + (−) stands for a
derivative being positive (negative).
dE [W s]
dκˆ
= (1− α) dE
[
usi
]
dκˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+α
d
(−Π2θσ2)
dκˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
∂
(−Π2zσ2z )
∂κˆ∗x︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
dκˆ∗x
dκˆ︸︷︷︸
+/−
+
∂
(−Π2zσ2z )
∂κˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
 .
10This situation arises, when α> 1− ρ and ∇˜<∇< 1, where ∇˜ is defined in the proof of Proposition
3. Under this set of parameters, this model admits multiple equilibria and in this example, we focus
on the change of social welfare in response to an change in capacity in a strategic utility maximizing
equilibrium. However, this result does not rely on this particular case. In fact, the proof of Proposition
6 also implies Proposition 5. To establish Proposition 6, we focus on cases in which only a unique
equilibrium exists.
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Proposition 6. (Too Much Capacity) Social welfare can be higher when agents are endowed
with a finite amount of capacity to process information than when they have an infinite amount
of capacity. Specifically, there is a finite κˆ′, such that
E
[W s(κˆ′)] > lim
κˆ→+∞
E [W s(κˆ)] ≡ E [Wms] .
This result is striking. When agents possess an infinite amount of capacity to pro-
cess information, they can perfectly observe both signals. In this case, the model is
identical to the Morris-Shin model, in which the social inefficiency is well understood,
i.e., agents overreact to the public signal. Specifically, the weight agents assign to the
public signal in their action is higher than that in their posterior belief, which is so-
cially costly because the coordination motive driving the overreaction does not count
in social welfare. Social welfare in the Morris-Shin model can be written as follows
E [Wms] = −
[
φmsx + φ
ms
z +
1
(1−α)φθ
(φmsx + φ
ms
z + φθ)
2 +
Πmsz
α
(1−α)
φmsx + φ
ms
z + φθ
]
1
σ4
,
where variables with superscript ms are counterparts in the Morris-Shin model.
In our case, capacity-limited agents cannot clearly observe signals; thus, their es-
timation of the underlying state is less accurate than that when they have an infinite
amount of capacity. However, agents may endogenously choose to spend very little
attention on observing the public signal, as a result, the total amount of noise in the
observation, zˆi, becomes very large. Therefore, they rely on it much less when they
take actions; that is, the weight that it is assigned, Πz, can be lower than Πmsz . A lower
level of capacity can actually be welfare enhancing, because it does, to some extent,
correct the inefficient use of public information. If the second effect dominates the
first, social welfare can be higher than that in the Morris-Shin model. See Figure 4.
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We demonstrate the two opposing effects with the following simple case. Let the
total amount of capacity in our model be κˆ0. We choose a set of parameter such that
agents are indifferent between specialization in the private signal or diversification;
that is, they endogenously ignore the public signal, or, φz = 0.11 We write social welfare
as follows
E [W s] = −
[
φx +
1
(1−α)φθ
(φx + φθ)
2
]
1
σ4
.
Given the finite capacity, agents cannot perfectly observe the private signal and
thus the precision of observation of the private signal is smaller; that is, φx < φmsx .
Moreover, in the Morris-Shin model, the public signal is also informative and enhances
the estimation of the underlying state, which results in φx < φmsx + φmsz . Intuitively,
agents with finite capacity are always worse off in terms of estimating the underlying
state. It always holds that
−
[
φx +
1
(1−α)φθ
(φx + φθ)
2
]
1
σ4
< −
[
φmsx + φ
ms
z +
1
(1−α)φθ
(φmsx + φ
ms
z + φθ)
2
]
1
σ4
.
The second term in E [Wms] shows the additional welfare loss caused by overusing
the public signal in the Morris-Shin model. There is no overuse of the public signal in
this particular finite-capacity case in that Πz = 0, because φz = 0. The socially costly
overreaction to the public signal does not exist in this case
0> −
[
Πmsz
α
(1−α)
φmsx + φ
ms
z + φθ
]
1
σ4
.
When social inefficiency is high in the Morris-Shin model, the welfare loss due to
“overreaction” to the public signal can be so large that the gain from a better esti-
mation of the fundamental is dominated.
Given that the capacity can be “too much,” is it possible for agents to voluntarily
burn some capacity to achieve higher welfare? The answer is no. That is because, if
everyone else collectively discards some of their capacity, individual i can increase her
welfare by fully using all of her capacity to enhance the estimation of the fundamental
in the first stage and adopting the same action strategy in the second stage to avoid
being “punished” for using a different strategy.12
11Section 4 demonstrates that such a κˆ0 exists, unless both α + ρ > 1 and ∇ > ∇˜ hold, where ∇˜ is
defined in the proof of Proposition 3.
12This argument can be formalized and its proof is available on request.
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6. Policy Issues
In previous sections, we have fully characterized the optimal attention allocation and
explored its implications for social welfare via comparative statics. In this section,
we discuss two welfare-related issues to shed light on how policy prescriptions in the
literature can be amended, considering that agents are capacity-constrained.
6.1. Transparency of Public Announcement
This study adds another dimension to the debate about central bank transparency.
Unlike the common presumption that higher transparency is always beneficial, Morris
and Shin (2002) show that it may be detrimental to social welfare when the central
bank delivers clearer public announcements. In their beauty contest model with an
exogenous information structure, an increase in the precision of public information
entails two opposing effects. On the one hand, it allows agents to better estimate
the underlying fundamental. On the other hand, it also increases agents’ reliance on
the noisy public information in their actions, which is socially costly. Both effects are
enlarged as the precision of public information increases. Morris and Shin (2002) show
that social welfare is U-shaped, such that when the precision of the public signal is
exceedingly low, the second effect dominates. Specifically, social welfare decreases in
its precision if and only if
σ2x
σ2z
+
σ2x
σ2
< (2α− 1)(1− α). (21)
Therefore, it may be socially desirable to withhold public information.
One important critique of this argument is Svensson (2006), that questions its em-
pirical relevancy and stresses that it can hold only when public information is im-
plausibly imprecise.13 See the dashed line in Figure 5 where social welfare is plotted
against the left side of equation (21), holding σ2x and σ2 fixed.14
However, we argue that the precision of the public signal needs not necessarily to
be exceedingly low to generate a decline in social welfare, when we allow for endoge-
nous attention allocation. When agents can decide to which information source they
pay their attention, the precision of each signal that they observe becomes endoge-
nous in that it not only depends on variances in sender noises, but also on those of
observation noises, which are chosen by agents.
To illustrate this, we plot social welfare in our model with the solid line in Figure
13Even the maximum of the right side of (21) is a very small number, which implies that σ2z must be
sufficiently large for this condition to hold.
14In this numerical example, α = 0.7 and σx = 0.1. σ is normalized to unit.
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Figure 5. Central bank transparency and social welfare.
5.15 When the precision of the public signal is very low, agents ignore it and focus on
the private signal. Therefore, a marginal increase in the precision of the public signal
does not affect social welfare. When the precision of the public signal is sufficiently
high, agents diversify their attention. An increase in its precision leads to a higher
reliance on the public signal in their action, as in Morris and Shin (2002). In addition,
agents also direct a larger proportion of their attention toward the public signal in
response to a higher precision. This additional mechanism reinforces the previous one
and both contribute to the decline in social welfare. As a result, social welfare still
decreases, even when the precision of the public signal is reasonably large.16
6.2. Efficient Use of Information and Attention Allocation
Angeletos and Pavan (2007) offer a flexible efficiency benchmark to assess the welfare
properties of a general class of games where the social value of coordination may be
higher or lower than the private one. One of the key insights in their framework of the
exogenous information structure is that the equilibrium use of information is efficient
if and only if the social and private values of coordination coincide. However, in this
section, we demonstrate that this result may not hold once we allow for an endoge-
nous information structure. Further, in this model, even though attention allocation is
efficient, it does not necessarily lead to an efficient use of information.
To accommodate this analysis, we enrich the payoff structure in this model by fol-
lowing Angeletos and Pavan (2007). Specifically, individual utility (1) is revised by
15In this numerical example, the capacity available to agents is κ = 3.2 bits and all other parame-
ters are the same as those for computing the counterpart in the Morris-Shin model. With this set of
parameters, there is a unique equilibrium.
16When the precision of the public signal is high enough, agents pay all their attention to the public
signal. In this situation, an increase in the precision of the public signal is always welfare-enhancing.
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adding a non-strategic term:
ui = −(ai − θ)2 − α1− α (Li − L¯)−
α∗
2 (1− α∗) L¯. (22)
Therefore, the corresponding social welfare is given by
W s (a,θ) =
∫
i
uidi =
∫
i
−(ai − θ)2 − α
∗
2 (1− α∗) L¯ di. (23)
The private value of coordination, or how much agents care about aligning their ac-
tions, is measured by α. The socially optimal degree of coordination is represented by
α∗ and it is the weight that the social planner would assign to the aggregate action in
its best response. Note that the beauty contest game considered in Morris and Shin
(2002) is a special case of this general setup, when α∗ = 0 or the social planner does
not value coordination. Efficient attention allocation and efficient use of information
are derived by solving a social planner problem while respecting the information pro-
cessing constraint (9).
In contrast to Angeletos and Pavan (2007), we argue that even when the central
planner corrects the coordination incentives of agents to the socially optimal level with
a tax policy, the equilibrium attention allocation and the use of information may still be
not socially optimal. The key to understanding this argument is to recall that multiple
equilibria may arise. Consider the case where the socially optimal degree of coordina-
tion α∗ is higher than the private value of coordination α and it is so high that there
exist multiple solutions in the central planner’s social welfare optimization problem.
It is obvious that the central planner picks the solution that gives rise to the highest
social welfare. In a decentralized economy, with a policy similar to that proposed in
Angeletos and Pavan (2007), the central planner can incentivize agents to value the co-
ordination as much as it does, but it is still undetermined on which equilibrium agents
coordinate. The planner needs another set of tools that help direct agents to coordinate
on the social welfare maximizing equilibrium.
Further, in this framework, the equilibrium use of information can still be ineffi-
cient, even though the equilibrium attention allocation is efficient. To see this, we as-
sume that α> α∗ > 0. The social planner also values the coordination and may dictate
that agents focus on the public signal and ignore the private one. Under the same con-
ditions, individuals could also choose exactly the same attention allocation. In other
words, the attention allocation is socially optimal. However, as the private and social
values of coordination differ, in the second stage, individuals would assign a higher
weight in their action strategy to the common prior than would the social planner. To
understand this, recall the fact that the common prior serves a “free public signal,”
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which does not require any attention, and individual observations on the public sig-
nal are imperfectly correlated across agents in this economy due to the idiosyncratic
observation noises. Therefore, the equilibrium use of information is still not socially
optimal.
7. Conclusion
There has been a recent surge of interest in modeling information acquisition and the
endogenous information structure in macroeconomic environments. See Veldkamp
(2011) for a textbook treatment on this topic and Hellwig, Kohls, and Veldkamp (2012)
for an excellent review. However, fewer studies have touched on the welfare impli-
cations of information acquisition in this class of economies. This study focuses ex-
clusively on a range of welfare issues in beauty contest models, in a context where
agents are rationally inattentive and therefore optimally allocate a limited amount of
attention between correlated private and public signals.
We fully characterize the sufficient and necessary conditions for the equilibrium
uniqueness and multiplicity, and show that the attention allocation and the number of
signals that agents decide to observe are not necessarily monotonic, in response to the
increase in the capacity of processing information. Unlike the literature, we also high-
light the role of the correlation between two signals, which critically affects the equi-
librium uniqueness and multiplicity, along with the welfare properties in this model.
Further, we show that in this setting, when capacity increases, the social welfare of this
economy may not necessarily increase. In fact, it can decrease as a result of attention
misallocation. Interestingly, social welfare can be even higher when agents possess a
finite amount of capacity than when they have an infinite amount of capacity.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First, we solve for the weighting rule adopted by all of the other
agents, on the condition that their attention allocation is (κˆ∗x, κˆ∗z ):
Π∗x =
φ∗x
φ∗x + φ∗z + φ∗θ
, Π∗z =
φ∗z
φ∗x + φ∗z + φ∗θ
, Π∗θ =
φ∗θ
φ∗x + φ∗z + φ∗θ
,
where
φ∗x =
1
σ2x + (ω
∗
x)
2 , φ
∗
z =
1
(1− α)σ2z + (ω∗z )2
, φ∗θ =
1
(1− α)σ2 ,
and
ω∗x =
√
(σ2x + σ
2) (1− ρ2)
exp (2κˆ∗x)− 1
, ω∗z =
√
(σ2z + σ
2) (1− ρ2)
exp (2κˆ∗z )− 1
.
Second, we solve for the optimal action rule for agent i, i.e., (Π∗z,i,Π
∗
x,i,Π
∗
θ,i), condi-
tional on the others’ allocation strategy (κˆ∗x, κˆ∗z ) and his own (κˆx,i, κˆz,i). It is the solution
to the following optimization problem,
max
Πx,i,Πz,i,Πθ,i
E [ui] s.t.
(
κˆz,j, κˆx,j
)
= (κˆ∗z , κˆ∗x) for all j 6= i,
where E [ui] is given by equation (14). First order conditions imply that
Π∗x,i =Π
∗
x +
(
c1Π∗θ − c2Π∗x
)
(c1 + c5 + c3 + c4)−
(
c1Π∗θ − c3Π∗z
)
(c1 + c5)
(c1 + c5 + c2) (c1 + c5 + c3 + c4)− (c1 + c5)2
, (24)
Π∗z,i =Π
∗
z +
(
c1Π∗θ − c3Π∗z
)
(c1 + c5 + c2)−
(
c1Π∗θ − c2Π∗x
)
(c1 + c5)
(c1 + c5 + c2) (c1 + c5 + c3 + c4)− (c1 + c5)2
. (25)
where
c1 = (1− α)σ2, c2 = σ2x +ω2x,i, c3 = (1− α)σ2z +ω2z,i,
c4 = ασ2z , c5 = ασ
2.
Therefore, the relative marginal return of attention on the public signal γ can be re-
written by replacing Π∗x,i and Π
∗
z,i with (24) and (25).
γ =
[
C1 exp (2κˆz,i) + C2 exp (2κˆ)
C3 exp (2κˆz,i) + C4
]2 1
∇2 exp (2κˆ) .
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where
C1 = [(1− α)Π∗θ + (1− α)Π∗z +Π∗x] (1−∇ρ) ,
C2 = α
(
1
ρ2
− 1
)
Π∗z + [(1− α)Π∗θ + (1− α)Π∗z +Π∗x]
(∇
ρ
− 1
)
,
C3 = [(1− α)Π∗θ + (1− α)Π∗z +Π∗x]
(
1
∇ρ − 1
)
,
C4 = α
(
1
∇ρ −
ρ
∇
)
Π∗z + [(1− α)Π∗θ + (1− α)Π∗z +Π∗x]
(
1− ρ∇
)
.
Therefore, we can show
∂γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z )
∂κˆz,i
< 0,
∂γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z )
∂∆
> 0,
∂γ (κˆz,i, κˆ∗z )
∂α
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. The first part of Lemma 1 implies that the best response of
agent i to the allocation strategy adopted by others is unique. Therefore, the allocation
(κˆx, κˆz) = (κˆ,0) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium if and only if γ(0,0) < 1. That is,
∇≤ exp (κˆ)ρ+ 1
exp (κˆ) + ρ
≡∇0.
Similarly, the allocation (κˆx, κˆz) = (0, κˆ) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium if and
only if γ(κˆ, κˆ) > 1. That is,
∇≥ (1− α) (exp(2κˆ)− 1) +
(
1− ρ2)
(1− α) (exp(2κˆ)− 1)ρ+ exp(κˆ) (1− ρ2) ≡∇1.
A diversification symmetric equilibrium must be such that κˆ∗z ∈ (0, κˆ) and it exists
if and only if γ (κˆ∗z , κˆ∗z ) = 1. That is, such an equilibrium arises if
∇ ∈ (min{∇0,∇1},max{∇0,∇1}) .
The optimal allocation is given by (18). Obviously, the equilibrium must be unique, if
∇0 <∇1, which also implies α< 1− ρexp(κˆ) . In other words, multiple equilibria emerge
if and only if the condition (20) holds.
Proof of Proposition 2. When κˆ is sufficiently large, ∇1 monotonically increases and
limκˆ→+∞∇1 = 1ρ while ∇0 monotonically decreases and limκˆ→+∞∇0 = ρ. Therefore,
for any∇, when κˆ is sufficiently large, it holds that∇∈ (∇0,∇1). According to Propo-
sition 1, the equilibrium is unique and 0 < κˆ∗z < κˆ. Further, the last part of this propo-
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Figure 6. Patterns of bounds ∇0 and ∇1.
sition can be obtained from equation (18).
Proof of Proposition 3. The complete characterization of the equilibrium attention al-
location can be summarized in the following claims.
Claim 1: If the relative accuracy is sufficiently low, agents specialize in learning
the private signal and then eventually diversify their attention when the capacity in-
creases, where
∇ˆ = 1
ρ
− 1
ρ
1
2
√
α(1−α)
(1−ρ2) ρ+
2(1−α)
(1−ρ2) ρ
2 + 1
;
in the former case, κˆ∗z /κˆ is monotonically decreasing in κˆ and in the latter, it can be
either monotonically increasing or hump-shaped.
Proof. It takes three steps to show this claim. First, we establish some properties of
∇0 and ∇1, illustrated in Figure 6. For any κˆ > 0, the bounds ∇0 and ∇1 can be
characterized as follows,
1. limκˆ→+∞∇0 = ρ and limκˆ→+∞∇1 = 1/ρ.
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2. ∇0(0) =∇1(0) = 1.
3. ∇0 monotonically decreases in κˆ.
4. ∇1 may or may not be monotone:
(i) If 0 < α < 1−ρ2 , ∇1 monotonically increases in κˆ. Otherwise, ∇1 decreases
and then increases, reaching the trough at κˆ = ˆˆκ, where
ˆˆκ = ln
(
ρ+
√
α (1− ρ2)/ (1− α)
)
.
(ii) If 1−ρ2 < α < 1− ρ, ∇1 is always larger than ∇0 for any κˆ.
(iii) If 1− ρ< α,∇0 and∇1 cross only once at κˆ= ln
( ρ
1−α
)
, on the condition that
κˆ is positive. Further, ∇1 is smaller than ∇0 if and only if κˆ < ln( ρ1−α ).
(iv) If 1− ρ< α< 1− ρ2,∇0 and∇1 cross on the left side of ˆˆκ; if 1− ρ2 < α< 1,
they cross on the right side of ˆˆκ.
We can show the first three items by using the expression in equation (19). The last
item can be verified by noting that,
d∇1
dκˆ
∝ (1− α)exp(2κˆ)− 2 (1− α)ρexp(κˆ) + ρ2 − α.
Denote ∇ˆ ≡ ∇1
( ˆˆκ) and ∇˜ ≡ ∇1 (ln( ρ1−α)), we obtain
∇ˆ = 1
ρ
− 1
ρ
1
2
√
α(1−α)
(1−ρ2) ρ+
2(1−α)
(1−ρ2) ρ
2 + 1
; ∇˜ = 1
ρ
− 1
ρ
α
(
1− ρ2)
1− (1− α)2 .
If ∇ ∈ (ρ,∇ˆ), it holds that ∇ <∇1 for any κˆ; and there exists a cutoff κˆ0, such that
for any κˆ ∈ (0, κˆ0), ∇ < ∇0 and for any κˆ ≥ κˆ0, ∇ ≥ ∇0. According to Proposition 1,
the first part of this Claim is shown.
Regarding the pattern of attention allocation κˆ∗z /κˆ, it can be categorized in the fol-
lowing three cases:
1. Despite the value of α, κˆ∗z /κˆ decreases monotonically, when the public signal is
relatively more accurate, i.e., ∇ > 1.
2. When the coordination motive is not so high, i.e., 0 < α < 1− ρ, κˆ∗z /κˆ is mono-
tonically increasing in κˆ, if ∇ <∇, where ∇ = [ρ+ (1− α)]/[(1− α)ρ+ 1]; and
is hump-shaped in κˆ, if ∇ <∇ < 1.
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3. When the coordination motive is high, i.e., 1− ρ < α, κˆ∗z /κˆ is hump-shaped in κˆ,
if ∇ <∇ <min{∇˜,∇ˆ}; and is monotonically increasing in κˆ, if ∇ <∇.
The details of the proof of this final part are contained in the Technical Appendix.
Claim 2: If the coordination motive is strong, i.e., (1− ρ)/2 < α ≤ 1− ρ, and the
relative accuracy is not extremely high, i.e., ∇ˆ < ∇ < 1, then agents re-allocate their
attention in the following fashion. When capacity increases, they specialize in learning
the private signal only, then diversify their attention allocation and then specialize in
learning the public signal only before eventually diversifying again. If the coordina-
tion motive is stronger, i.e., 1− ρ< α< 1− ρ2, then agents allocate their attention such
that when the relative accuracy is medium, i.e., ∇ˆ <∇ < ∇˜, where
∇˜ = 1
ρ
− 1
ρ
α
(
1− ρ2)
1− (1− α)2 .
Proof. We show that ∇˜ < 1 if and only if ρ > 1− α. The rest of the proof is similar to
that of Claim 1.
Claim 3: If the coordination motive is very strong, i.e., 1− ρ< α< 1, and the relative
accuracy is not extremely high, i.e., ∇˜ <∇ < 1, then agents re-allocate their attention
in the following fashion. When the capacity is sufficiently low, they focus only on the
private signal. When the capacity is higher, they may coordinate on one of the three
equilibria. When there is a further increase in capacity, they pay attention only to the
public signal, and when the capacity is sufficiently high, they eventually diversify.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Claim 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. This proof offers a sufficient condition under which Lemma 2 holds.
We consider the following two cases: (i) 2α+ ρ > 1, (1− α)exp(κˆ) > ρ and ∇ < 1; (ii)
α+ ρ > 1 and ∇ < ∇ˆ. Under these two cases, if κˆ > κˆ0, 0 ≤ κˆ∗x < κˆ. Therefore, we can
show,
dκˆ∗x
dκˆ
∝ (∇− ρ) (1− α)exp(2κˆ)−
[(
1− ρ2
)
− (1− ρ∇) (1− α)
]
(1− α)exp(κˆ)
− ((1− α)exp(κˆ)− ρ)
[(
1− ρ2
)
− (1− α) (1−∇ρ)
]
<
[
(∇− ρ)exp(κˆ)−
(
1− ρ2
)
+ (1− ρ∇) (1− α)
]
(1− α)exp(κˆ).
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Therefore, dκˆ∗x/dκˆ < 0, if
[
(∇− ρ)exp(κˆ)− (1− ρ2)+ (1− ρ∇) (1− α)] < 0. This
holds true, if
1−∇ρ
∇− ρ < exp(κˆ) <
(
1− ρ2)− (1− ρ∇) (1− α)
∇− ρ .
The first inequality must hold so that κˆ > κˆ0. The second inequality can hold on the
condition that α is sufficiently large; that is,
α > 1−
(
1− ρ2)
(1− ρ∇) .
Proof of Proposition 4. A simple calculation leads to
d∇1
dρ
=
(exp (2κˆ)− 1) (1− α) [− (1− α) (exp (2κˆ)− 1) + 2ρexp (κˆ)− (1+ ρ2)]
[(1− α) (exp (2κˆ)− 1)ρ+ exp (κˆ) (1− ρ2)]2
.
Let T1 = − (1− α) (exp (2κˆ)− 1) + 2ρexp (κˆ) −
(
1+ ρ2
)
. If and only if ρ < (1 −
α)exp (κˆ), T1 decreases in κˆ and T1 < 0. In other words, d∇1/dρ < 0 for any κˆ >
ln(ρ/(1− α)). This implies that κˆ1 increases in ρ. Similarly, we can show that∇0 is an
increasing function of ρ, and therefore κˆ0 increases in ρ.
Let l(κˆ) be the difference between the expected utility of adopting the strategy
κˆ∗z = κˆ and that of κˆ∗z = 0, when condition (20) holds. The cutoff κˆs is such that l(κˆs) = 0.
It implies that κˆ∗z = κˆ if and only if
l(κˆ) =
[
1+
(1− ρ2)
exp(2κˆ)− 1
]
∇2 − αρ∇−
[ (
1− ρ2)
exp(2κˆ)− 1 + (1− α)
]
> 0.
Under this circumstance, it is straightforward to show the following facts: l(κˆ) is
strictly increasing in κˆ, limκˆ→0 l(κˆ) < 0 and limκˆ→+∞ l(κˆ) > 0. Therefore, there is a
unique κˆs > 0, such that l(κˆs) = 0, where
κˆs = ln
(√
(1− ρ2) (1−∇2)
α (1− ρ∇)− (1−∇2) + 1
)
.
By noting that κˆs decreases in ρ, this proposition is shown.
Proof of Proposition 5. We show that social welfare can be decreasing in the case
where α + ρ > 1 and ∇˜ < ∇ < 1. If κˆ∗z = 0 or κˆ∗z = κˆ, social welfare is calculated by
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the following
E [W s] = −
1+ (1− α) φxφθ(
φx
φθ
+ 1
)2
σ2,
E [W s] = −
1+ (1− α) φzφθ(
φz
φθ
+ 1
)2
σ2 − α
(
φz
φθ
)2
(
φz
φθ
+ 1
)2σ2z ,
when κˆ < κˆs, κˆ∗z = 0 and dE [W (a,θ)]/dκˆ > 0. To see this, we notice that φx increases
in κˆ and E [W s] increases in φx,
dE [W s]
dφx
=
σ2
[
(1+ α) + (1− α) φxφθ
]
(
1+ φxφθ
)3
φθ
> 0.
Similarly, when κˆs < κˆ < κˆ1, κˆ∗z = κˆ and social welfare increases in κˆ. When κˆ = κˆs,
agents are indifferent of specialization in private or public signals, which implies that
φx = φz, and social welfare discontinuously decreases at κˆ = κˆs. Because E [W s] mono-
tonically increases in κˆ, when κˆ < κˆs, there must exist κˆa and κˆb such that E [W s(κˆa)]>
E [W s(κˆb)] and κˆa < κˆs < κˆb.
Proof of Proposition 6. Except in the case where α + ρ > 1 and ∇˜ < ∇ < 1, we can
show that κˆ∗x = κˆ0 and κˆ∗z = 0, when κˆ = κˆ0. To show E [W s(κˆ0)] > E [Wms], we only
need to show f ≡ E [W s(κˆ0)]− E [Wms] > 0, where
f =
1(
ρ
(∇−ρ) +
1
(1−α)(1−∇ρ)
) − α ρ(∇−ρ)(
ρ
(∇−ρ) +
1
(1−α)(1−∇ρ)
)2
− 1(
ρ(1−∇2)
(1−ρ∇)(∇−ρ) +
1
1−α
) − α ρ(1−∇
2)
(1−ρ∇)(∇−ρ)(
ρ(1−∇2)
(1−ρ∇)(∇−ρ) +
1
1−α
)2 .
To provide a sufficient condition under which the inequality holds, we denote
f (α) = f1 (α) + f2 (α) ,
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where
f1 (α) =
(
1
1− ρ∇ − 1
)
(1− α)2
(
−α2 + 4α− 2
)( ρ
∇− ρ
)2
f2 (α) =
(1− α)2 ρ∇
1− ρ∇
[(
1
1− ρ∇ − 1
)
(α− 2)2 + 2
(
1
1− ρ∇ − 1
)2
− 2− 1
1− ρ∇
(2− α)2
(1− α)2
]
f1 (α) > 0 if and only if −α2 + 4α − 2 > 0, or α > 2−
√
2. When ∇ is sufficiently
low and close to ρ, ρ∇−ρ can be arbitrarily large and
1
1−ρ∇ is close to a constant
1
1−ρ2 .
Therefore, f1 (α) can be arbitrarily large and f2 (α) is close to a constant. Moreover, it
must hold that ρ < (1− α)exp(κˆ0) or,
(1− α)
ρ
>
∇− ρ
1− ρ∇ .
This holds when ∇ is low enough.
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Technical Appendix
(Not intended for publication)
Proof of Proposition 3, Part 3. The following claim is particularly useful for our char-
acterization.
Claim 1: When the equilibrium is unique, the fraction of attention paid to the public
signal, i.e., κˆ∗z /κˆ, strictly increases in κˆ if and only if 0< κˆ∗z /κˆ < 1 and
κˆ∗z
κˆ
− F (κˆ) < 0, (26)
where
F ≡1
2
+
1
2
T
(1− α) (1− ρ∇) (∇− ρ) ·
1
1− (1−ρ2)−(1−α)(1−ρ∇)
(∇−ρ)exp(κˆ)
· 1
exp (κˆ)− ρ1−α
,
T =(1− ρ∇)α [(1− ρ∇) (1− α)− ρ (∇− ρ)] .
Proof. We re-write equation (18) as follows,
κˆ∗z
κˆ
=
1
2
+
1
2 ln
[
(1−α)(1−ρ∇)+(∇−ρ)exp(κˆ)−(1−ρ2)
(1−α)(1−ρ∇)exp(κˆ)+(∇−ρ)−∇(1−ρ2)
]
ln [exp (κˆ)]
. (27)
Derive its derivative with respect to exp(κˆ) and we find that ∂(κˆ∗z /κˆ)/∂exp (κˆ) > 0 if
and only if the condition (26) holds.
We first show that in the case of ∇ > 1, κˆ∗z /κˆ monotonically decreases in κˆ, when
κˆ > κˆ1. There are three sub-cases.
Case 1: α < 1− ρ and ∇ ∈
(
1−α+ρ2
(1−α)ρ+ρ ,
1
ρ
)
. We can verify that T < 0 and further
0> ln
(
ρ
1− α
)
> ln
((
1− ρ2)− (1− α) (1− ρ∇)
∇− ρ
)
,
which implies that F (κˆ) is strictly increasing and approaches 1/2 from below when κˆ
approaches +∞.
We can also show that κˆ∗z /κˆ approaches 1/2 from above, because the second term
in (27) is positive when κˆ approaches +∞, i.e.,
lim
κˆ→+∞
ln
[
(1− α) (1− ρ∇) + (∇− ρ)exp (κˆ)− (1− ρ2)
(1− α) (1− ρ∇)exp (κˆ) + (∇− ρ)−∇ (1− ρ2)
]
= ln
[ ∇− ρ
(1− α) (1− ρ∇)
]
> 0.
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Further, the first part of Proposition 3 implies that limκˆ→κˆ+1 κˆ
∗
z /κˆ= 1. We can show that
κˆ∗z /κˆ − F (κˆ) > 0, for any κˆ > κˆ1, by constructing a contradiction. Suppose there exists
κˆ′ such that κˆ∗z (κˆ′)/κˆ′ < F(κˆ′). Claim 1 implies that it must hold that κˆ∗z /κˆ approaches
1/2 from below. A contradiction. This fact further implies that κˆ∗z /κˆ monotonically
decreases, by using Claim 1 again.
Case 2: α < 1− ρ and ∇ ∈
(
1, 1−α+ρ
2
(1−α)ρ+ρ
)
. In this case, we can show that F (κˆ) is
strictly decreasing and approaches 1/2 from above, when κˆ approaches +∞. Further,
it must hold that F(κˆ1) ≤ 1, that is because κˆ∗z /κˆ must decrease, when κˆ is slightly
higher than κˆ1, according to the first part of Proposition 3.
Similar to the previous case, Claim 1 implies that κˆ∗z /κˆ − F (κˆ) cannot cross zero
from above; that is, κˆ∗z /κˆ − F (κˆ) > 0 for any κˆ > κˆ1. In other words, κˆ∗z /κˆ decreases
monotonically.
Case 3: The proof for the case where α > 1− ρ and ∇ > 1 is similar.
We then establish that κˆ∗z /κˆ can be either monotonically increasing or hump-shaped
when ∇ < 1.
Case 1: α < 1− ρ and ∇ ∈ (ρ,∇). In this case, we can show that F(κˆ) is mono-
tonically decreasing and approaches 1/2 from above. The first part of Proposition
3 implies that limκˆ→κˆ+0 κˆ
∗
z /κˆ = 0. Under this case, κˆ∗z /κˆ approaches 1/2 from below
because the second term in (27) is negative when κˆ approaches +∞, i.e.,
lim
κˆ→+∞
ln
[
(1− α) (1− ρ∇) + (∇− ρ)exp (κˆ)− (1− ρ2)
(1− α) (1− ρ∇)exp (κˆ) + (∇− ρ)−∇ (1− ρ2)
]
= ln
[ ∇− ρ
(1− α) (1− ρ∇)
]
< 0.
Using similar arguments in previous cases, we can show that κˆ∗z /κˆ monotonically in-
creases in κˆ.
Case 2: α ∈ (0,1− ρ) and∇∈ (∇,1). This case differs from the previous one in that
κˆ∗z /κˆ approaches 1/2 from above when κˆ→+∞. Therefore, Claim 1 implies that κˆ∗z /κˆ
must be increasing and then decreasing, i.e., it is hump-shaped.
The proofs of the remaining cases are also similar.
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